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CHAPTER 9
When Is a Diaspora Not 
a Diaspora?
Rethinking Nation-Centered Narratives about 
Germans in Habsburg East Central Europe
Pieter Judson
With this chapter I want to encourage German historians to broaden 
their understanding of the term German beyond a nation-state-cen­
tered concept that for too long has privileged the German state 
founded in 1871 as the social, cultural, and political embodiment of a 
German nation. I suggest that communities in Habsburg East Central 
Europe, popularly constructed by German politicians and historians 
alike in the interwar period as diasporas, could not possibly have seen 
themselves in these terms much before 1918. When such communities 
did adopt a more nationalist identity in the post-1918 period, they usu­
ally referred back to prewar ideologies for guidance, traditions that 
had rarely made their relationship to Germany a necessary component 
of community identity. As a consequence of the national humiliations 
imposed by the Versailles and Trianon settlements, Germans in Ger­
many tended increasingly to characterize such communities as “lost 
diasporas,” eliding their fates with those of Germany’s lost territories 
in West Prussia and Silesia. Not until the economically depressed 
1930S, however, did Nazi propaganda and offers of support (cultural, 
political, and financial) to these hard-pressed communities succeed in 
creating a new self-understanding among them as diasporas of the 
German nation-state. Nazi annexations (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, 
Southern Styria) and attempted population transfers (Bukovina, 
South Tyrol) enabled these communities later and misleadingly to be 
remembered by community activists and historians alike as age-old 
diasporas, defined primarily by their relationship to Germany.
The use of this term German diaspora as an analytic tool requires a
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critical acknowledgment of that concept’s twentieth-century deriva­
tion from the related concept of the territorial nation-state. Like the 
terms nation, race, or ethnicity, the term diaspora rests on historically 
shifting ideological presumptions. This does not mean that ideas of 
diaspora, just like those of race, nation or ethnicity, cannot produce 
material and social effects. But it does require the social scientist to dis­
tinguish carefully between the ways in which nationalist ideologists 
deployed the term diaspora (to argue for a necessary relationship 
between those communities and the German state) and the ways in 
which those communities understood their own identification as Ger­
man. To use the concept German diaspora without interrogating its 
potentially normative and nationalist presumptions risks reading con­
temporary forms of self- and group identification back onto its inno­
cent subjects, for whom such forms of self-identification may have held 
little meaning.'
For German historians in the twentieth century, the concept of Ger­
man diasporas in East Central Europe seems to have embodied a com­
mon-sense logic. Substantial populations of German-speaking people 
living outside of the German nation-state in Eastern Europe formed 
diasporic communities that looked to Germany to reinforce a sense of 
their own cultural identity, historical continuity, and sometimes politi­
cal influence. Such communities were often understood both by them­
selves and by Germany as the product of successive waves of German 
migration or colonization reaching back into the medieval period. 
Local rulers, so the story went, had invited communities of German 
artisans, merchants, and farmers to settle in particular regions of the 
East, often giving these settlers a privileged legal position vis-a-vis local 
Slavic populations. The concept of historic colonization underlying 
much of the rhetoric about diasporas in the East often functioned to 
reassure Germans in the new German state that their national identity 
could be defined by a long history of economic success and cultural 
superiority.^
Other authors in this volume demonstrate that the ways communi­
ties around the world defined themselves as German reflected contin­
gent and situational conditions that shaped their particular assertions 
of identity rather than some fundamentally authentic historic shared 
identity. We should remember this caveat as we examine German­
speaking communities situated geographically much closer to Ger­
many. Their very proximity to Germany made them useful pawns in 
the foreign political dreams of ideologists hoping to realize an 
expanded German nation-state after the defeat of 1918. In the post-1918
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political landscape these communities may have occasionally flirted 
with a self-characterization as linked to the German nation-state. It 
was, however, their problematic place within new self-proclaimed 
nation-states, not their traditional ways of identifying themselves, that 
produced any such characterizations.
As difficult as it might be for us living in a globally nationalized 
world to imagine it. East Central Europeans who claimed membership 
in a German nation before 1918 often rejeeted any formal relationship 
to the German nation-state founded in 1871 and saw no contradiction 
in that choice. Confusion around this issue stems partly from the 
degree to which nationalists and their agendas in Germany itself dom­
inated early writing about German diasporas, interpretations that were 
often unwittingly taken up by later historians. Confusion also results 
from the ways in which social scientists too often come to view their 
own categories for interpreting the past as having had significanee for 
the contemporaries who lived them. When we consider those substan­
tial communities of German speakers located in the Austrian half of 
the Dual Monarchy, where categories unrelated to our contemporary 
understanding of nation often shaped personal and community iden­
tity, the concept of diaspora takes on far different meanings. Here we 
find German nationalists who did not define themselves in relation to 
Wilhelmine Germany, who imagined their links with Wilhelmine Ger­
many as comparable to their relations to German communities in 
other parts of Imperial Austria.3
This chapter will examine two linked phenomena: the implicit 
assumption that Central and Eastern Europeans categorized by a cen­
sus as German speakers actually shared a common German identity 
and the largely post-1918 nationalist presumption that such groups 
formed diasporic communities that sought a relationship to the self- 
proclaimed German nation-state. Such German speakers often did not 
think of themselves as Germans before 1918, and even for committed 
nationalists, the demands of living in the anational Austrian Empire 
made the issue of any relationship to Wilhelmine Germany largely 
irrelevant.4
Both the experienee of wartime occupation in the East and the cata­
strophic outcome of the war for Germany and Austria-Hungary 
helped intensify the popular interest in the Weimar Republic for com­
munities of Germans living outside Germany. It created an entirely 
new potential for imagining the future of these Germans specifically in 
terms of their relationship to the German state, something that would 
have been impossible as long as the Habsburg monarchy existed. This
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popular obsession in Germany with the Germans of the East rapidly 
replaced interest in Germany’s lost colonial empire, for example, as 
Lora Wildenthal has recently demonstrated in her work on German 
women’s colonialist organizations. These groups, formerly devoted to 
the advancement of German settlement in Africa, often shifted their 
focus rapidly to the so-called lost German communities of Eastern 
Europe in the years following the war. The intensified promotion of 
Ostforschung in Germany and Austria, both in nationalist and aca­
demic circles after 1918, reflected a similar trend.5 
The outcome of the war also produced a reconceptualization of the 
content and significance of German nationality among German-speak­
ing communities in East Central Europe. At first German speakers often 
responded to the collapse of the Habsburg state by imagining that they 
could maintain their traditional community identity within the new 
states while shifting their loyalty from Vienna to rulers in the new capi­
tal. Elowever, this option soon became impossible, given the ways that 
their new rulers conceptualized citizenship rights. German-speaking 
communities that had formerly existed within the multinational Habs­
burg state were absorbed, often forcibly, into new, self-styled nation­
states that defined the term nation in narrow linguistic terms. Their new 
rulers quickly labeled these communities as either Germanized 
nationals~and capable of reintegration into the Czech, Polish, Slovene, 
or Italian nation—or as German nationals—and barred from member­
ship in the new nation-state. This latter categorization often justified the 
forced expropriation of German community resources, the elosing of 
German-language schools, and the banning of German voluntary asso­
ciations, even if, as mentioned previously, those German-speaking com­
munities offered declarations of loyalty to their new rulers.®
Several German-speaking communities found themselves forced for 
the first time to consider their own identities in terms of the German 
nation-state, a state that had meant little to them in the recent past. 
This was due less to some spontaneous growth in nationalist identity, 
loyalty, or renewed interest in Heimat among German speakers and 
more to the radical political, social, and economic structural changes 
brought about by the postwar order in Central and Eastern Europe. A 
reorientation of German speakers in the new Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Romania, or Yugoslavia toward Germany was not automatic, and as 
an outcome it was in no way predestined. Several German speakers in 
these communities chose to emigrate or flee, and several also assimi­
lated to the dominant language group of the new nation-state.^ It is
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worth repeating that the policies of the new rulers, eager to create 
nations with which to people their new nation-states, produced a new 
sense of identity as “German diasporas” among these communities; 
this identity was not solely the initiative of the German speakers them­
selves. It was not foreordained that German speakers should in any 
way express a particular interest in, or feel any special relationship to, 
Germany, just as it was not foreordained that Czech or Polish nation­
alists should define national citizenship in their new states in narrow 
linguistic terms. Yet their sudden new status as second-class citizens, as 
Germans in Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Romania, or Yugoslavia, 
made these German speakers more aware of possible links between 
their cultural forms of self-identification, a putative national identity, 
and the German nation-state.
Often at this moment after the war, German speakers in Habsburg 
East Central Europe became German nationals; their communities 
developed completely new identities that slowly reframed their inter­
ests in terms of their potential relationship to the German state.* Sev­
eral other populations in the region experienced a similar reorientation 
of identity, among them those now identified as Hungarians in Czecho­
slovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia; Ukrainians in the Soviet Union 
and Romania; and Jews everywhere (to name but a few). All found 
themselves defined by hostile governments as minority subaltern pop­
ulations. They lived uneasily within self-styled nation-states as second- 
class citizens or as objects of forceful policies of assimilation, despite 
the legal guarantees of the minority protection treaties imposed on the 
new nation-states by the victorious powers.^
These communities of German speakers did have a legacy of rhetor­
ical and organizational tools at their disposal for making sense of their 
new situation. These tools stressed the commonalties of German-lan­
guage minority communities in East Central Europe and not their rela­
tionship to the German state. For almost three decades German 
nationalist activists had worked tirelessly to promote a sense of nation­
alist self-identification among different language groups throughout 
the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy. Activists’ efforts to promote 
national unity among Germans in Cisleithania, or even a serious belief 
in the importance of nation as such, had not always been successful, as 
we will see subsequently. Yet whatever their degree of success before 
the war, activists left a compelling potential legacy to those in the post- 
1918 world who sought strategies with which to understand their con­
dition as national outsiders.
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Nationalization and Its Limits in Pre-1918 Austria
The nationalization efforts that had dominated Austrian public life in 
the years before 1914 differed from apparently similar processes that 
characterized public life in self-styled nation-states like Germany, 
France, or Italy in the late nineteenth century. The Austrian state did 
indeed promote the kinds of administrative centralization and social 
integration associated with modernization processes elsewhere in 
Europe. Yet these policies did not involve the advancement of national 
identity to unify a disparate citizenry. Rather, the Habsburg state 
made Austrian identity dependent on the individual’s (and later the 
group’s) loyalty to the dynasty. Austrian patriotic symbols, rituals, 
and festivals served to highlight the overwhelming devotion of an 
admittedly culturally diverse population to its monarch. The state 
itself remained firmly anational, even as it worked to unify diverse pop­
ulations. It did not wish to recognize the possible existence of nation­
alities either in statistical surveys or in policy-making.'®
The liberal Austrian constitutions of 1848 and 1867 had recognized 
that differences in religion and in language constituted special cases for 
ensuring that institutions treat diverse individuals equally, and it was 
around the latter guarantee that nationalists built their movements." 
Starting with Czech nationalists in the i86os, each movement invoked 
the constitutional guarantee of linguistic equality for individuals both 
to define its own nationalist goals and to reform as many aspects of 
public life as possible. Language use both in the schools and in the 
bureaucracy provided the key legal fields for the activism pursued by a 
broad range of nationalist political movements. While their activism 
was designed to gain for each nation as large a share of state resources 
as possible (everything from the right to petition the civil service in 
one’s own language to school funds for minority students to bilingual 
street signs), nationalists never sought to replace the Habsburg state 
with a series of nation-states. Indeed, nationalists often competed with 
each other rhetorically to assert their own nation’s greater loyalty to 
the dynastic state. Ironically, by 1914, as Jeremy King has so aptly 
noted, anational Austrian law had been forced to recognize the exis­
tence of nations within Austria rather than the existence of individuals 
who spoke different languages. “In a trend with few European paral­
lels,” writes King, “the state began to become multinational.”'^
This “multinationalization” of society was the often unintended 
result of institutional agreements like the Moravian Compromise of 
1905, which sought to diffuse conflict between Czech and German
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nationalists by removing national issues from the realm of politics. 
Resources and political competencies in Moravia would now be 
divided between the two sides: Germans and Czechs gained separate 
school systems, and they voted in separate curias (Czech and German 
candidates for political office no longer ran against each other). The 
requirement that all citizens self-consciously declare their adherence to 
one nation or the other produced an enormous if unintended national­
ization of public life. Where before they might have considered them­
selves to be “Moravian” (and demand a bilingual, or Utraquist, edu­
cation for their children), now Moravian citizens were forced to 
assume a national identity as Czechs or Germans.‘3
Not surprisingly, German nationalist activism throughout Austria 
had assumed an especially defensive quality from the start. It origi­
nated in the 1880s largely as a reaction against perceived legal and insti­
tutional inroads made by other linguistic groups at the expense of Ger­
man speakers. German nationalism asserted a privileged place for the 
Germans within the empire on the basis of their eultural, economic, 
and occasionally numeric superiority. To justify German linguistic 
privilege, nationalists pointed to statistical evidence that German 
speakers paid proportionally far more taxes than anyone else in Aus­
tria did. They also promoted a particular cultural understanding of 
historic Habsburg expansion in the East as a German colonial or civi­
lizing mission. This German nationalism did not, however, include 
irredentist yearnings for Anschluss with the kleindeutsch German state 
founded in 1871. To the contrary, most German speakers in Austria 
who even considered the matter desired little more than a formal polit­
ical alliance for Austria-Hungary with Germany. Given a belief in their 
own historical mission in the East, given their overwhelmingly 
Catholic cultural bent, and given their perceptions of Prussia as cultur­
ally Protestant, most nationalists who even thought about the matter 
rejected the irredentist (and anti-Catholic) ravings of a Georg von 
Sch6nerer.“4
If Austro-German nationalists rejected an identity defined in terms 
of their relationship to the Wilhelmine German nation-state, other 
aspects of German nationalist culture in Austria also undermined the 
notion of a necessary relationship to Germany. Two apparently con­
tradictory tendencies helped ensure that German nationalists in Aus­
tria left Germany out of any nationalist or political mental equation. 
First, the traditional Austro-German liberal view dominant from 1848 
through the 1870s (which survived in many forms down to 1945 and 
complicated later Nazi policy in the Sudetenland and the Protectorate)
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held that Germanness was an elite cultural quality that could in theory 
be adopted by other groups in Eastern Europe as they worked to 
improve themselves. In this view Germanness was linked neither to 
descent nor to a particular territory but rather to cultural capital. Lib­
erals had expected that, even if other linguistic groups maintained their 
own folk traditions, they would educate their youth in German and 
that their education would assimilate these newcomers into the ranks 
of a larger German humanist elite. Although such a large-scale assimi­
lation never came to pass, it meant that early German nationalism 
lacked the quality of territorialization found among some other 
nationalist movements in the empire.'^ Austro-Germans who even 
considered the matter were used to thinking of their nation as a quality 
rather than as a place, thus relativizing the importance of the Wil- 
helmine state founded in 1871. Later German nationalists had to create 
a link between the specific territory they claimed and their concept of 
Germanness.
The second point is that the critical importance of regional loyalties 
for German nationalists in Austria before 1914 often tended to rela- 
tivize any potentially unique role that Wilhelmine Germany might 
play. Several interregional nationalist associations worked hard after 
1880 to foster a sense of unity among communities of German speakers 
(and their territories) spread throughout Austria, but there is little evi­
dence to suggest that they came close to accomplishing their goal. As 
Laurence Cole has recently demonstrated for the Tyrol, concepts of 
German national identity often served highly regionalist ends, assum­
ing specific qualities that gave them little in common with concepts of 
Germanness in other parts of the monarchy. In the Tyrol, for example, 
German nationalism was defined primarily by loyalty to church, to 
dynasty, and to the particular provincial interests of the Tyrol vis-a-vis 
the centralizing state in Vienna. This put Tyrolean German national­
ists bitterly at odds, for example, with their counterparts in Styria, for 
whom liberal anticlericalism played a crucial role in self-definition, or 
with Bohemian German nationalists, who viewed the central state as 
critical to the maintenance of their minority rights against majority 
Czechs.'®
Even within the same province nationalist organizations might dis­
agree on the fundamentals of identity. The Union of Germans in 
Bohemia (Bund der Deutschen in Bohmen), for example, promoted a 
racially anti-Semitic definition of the German nation while the German 
Union of the Bohemian Woods (Deutscher Bohmerwaldbund) 
remained open to Jewish membership and even sported a Jewish exec-
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utive board member. The interregional German School Association 
(Deutscher Schulverein) recognized at least tacitly the important role 
Jewish private schools played in educating German-speaking children, 
where their minority status meant that the state did not fund a Ger­
man-language school. The interregional Sudmark, however, con­
structed Jews as the racial enemies of Germans. Farther to the east, the 
world of German nationalists in Galicia and the Bukovina was almost 
completely alien in its concerns to that of German nationalists in the 
West. Yet even among such apparently isolated German-speaking 
communities as those in the East, to which I will return later, German 
community identity did not rest on a concept of diaspora.'?
If regionalist differences slowed the construction of a common Ger­
man national movement or even a common sense of self-identification, 
a challenge admittedly faced by nationalists in the new Wilhelmine 
Reich as well as by those in Austria, other obstacles also stood in the 
way of making populations national.'^ Despite some twenty-five years 
of successful activism, by 1914 German nationalists consistently 
expressed frustration in their aim to achieve a unified and politically 
effective German identity among German speakers in Austria. What 
they had generally accomplished by 1914 was a considerable national­
ization of white-collar professionals such as civil servants, teachers, 
service employees, and politicians at all levels of government, whose 
interests tended to be more directly impacted by nationalist legislation 
than those of other social groups.
This is particularly clear in the cases of teachers and civil servants. 
Changes over time in the state’s linguistic requirements for positions in 
the local and regional civil service, for example, appeared adversely to 
affect the ongoing chances of educated German speakers to obtain 
such posts. German nationalists claimed that, as governments adopted 
new rules promoting bilingual administration in provinces like 
Bohemia, Moravia, or Styria—concessions, apparently, to Slav 
nationalist agitation—German-speaking candidates were increasingly 
disadvantaged. Slav candidates would more likely be selected for such 
posts, it was argued, because they were more likely to be competent in 
both their own languages and German, while Germans rarely learned 
a Slavic language.'^ These kinds of concerns shaped political agendas 
in turn. After 1890 German nationalists increasingly demanded admin­
istrative autonomy for purely German-speaking districts within bilin­
gual provinces like Bohemia and Moravia in order to free as many 
local civil servant posts as possible from the supposedly onerous dual 
language requirement. In multilingual regions where administrative
228 The Heimat Abroad
separation was not viable, nationalist organizations like the Sudmark 
in fact changed their strategies by 1909 and began encouraging German 
speakers preparing for the civil service to take classes in a Slavic lan­
guage. “
If such issues worried some segments of the population consider­
ably, they do not appear to have resonated to the same extent with the 
majority of German speakers in the empire. Nationalists of all stripes 
had far less success mobilizing rural populations or the industrial 
working classes for specifically nationalist ends. National identity, 
often defined in urban bourgeois terms, had less immediate relevance 
to these groups, although it appears to have held a marginally greater 
significance to Czech-speaking workers and peasants than to their Ger­
man-speaking counterparts.^' German nationalists complained consis­
tently about their inability to gain long-term support among both these 
social groups, although the nature of their own efforts made them 
more likely to succeed among peasants and the rural Mittelstand than 
among industrial workers.
In order to fortify existing rural German-speaking minorities against 
the gradual “incursions” of other populations, nationalists tried to 
strengthen existing minority communities by preventing the rise of 
conditions that promoted emigration or assimilation to another lan­
guage group. It was not simply a question of avoiding foreclosures on 
Germans’ farms by supplying cheap credit. It also meant promoting 
educational opportunities in German for rural youth and making sure 
that communities had a diverse population of artisans to serve their 
basic consumer needs. Several regional associations promoted the eco­
nomic well-being of rural German-speaking populations by making 
cheap credit available to them, offering free classes on agricultural 
innovation, promoting job exchanges, and subsidizing the purchase of 
anything from fruit trees to farm implements. Yet for all of these 
efforts, it was not clear that nationalists had in fact succeeded in 
nationalizing the peasantry and the rural Mittelstand by 1914. In polit­
ical terms their efforts did not always produce significantly greater 
numbers of nationalist voters in rural constituencies, for example. Nor 
did peasants necessarily understand the economic and educational 
efforts of the associations in primarily nationalist terms, though often 
in welfare terms.
Nationalists did not often attempt a comparable effort in majority 
German-speaking industrial regions, where, for example, Slav-speak­
ing workers migrated in increasing numbers by 1900. The industrial 
working class in turn was largely politically loyal to the Austrian Social
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Democratic Party, an organization theoretically opposed to the chau­
vinist interests of bourgeois nationalism. It was not so much their 
nationalism that may have prevented German nationalists from mak­
ing inroads into socialist political support, however, but rather their 
unwillingness to address issues of concern to working-class Austrians. 
A series of articles published by the organization Siidmark in 1909 rec­
ognized this nationalist inability to speak to the concerns of industrial 
workers and warned that, without a mass base to lend it credibility, 
German nationalism could not achieve the political influence it hoped 
to gain within the empire: “Whenever we demanded of the German 
worker that he subordinate his class to his volkisch interests . . . these 
so-called volkisch interests often proved to be the class interests of the 
mighty who [at that time] dominated the German parties.In the 
final years before the outbreak of war, a few initiatives to organize 
unions and parties that would bring German workers into the nation­
alist movement took shape, but their successes were limited to very
specific regions.^3
German Identities
As previously noted, German nationalist activists rarely mentioned 
relations with Germany as a defining or even an important issue. Their 
self-identification did not flow from the explicit belief in a significant 
relationship to Germany but rather from the situation of German 
speakers in Austria. While there might exist a self-styled German 
nation-state to the north and west of Cisleithania, the fact remained 
that over ten million German speakers lived under Habsburg rule and 
many considered themselves part of a larger German nation that was 
not defined by the territory of Wilhelmine Germany. An examination 
of the way nationalist organizations defined their goals demonstrates 
that when German nationalists thought about the German nation it 
was in a way that did not privilege Germany. And as much as the 
wartime alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary sparked the 
collective imagination of Austro-German nationalists, causing them to 
reimagine their present and future relationship to the Wilhelmine 
Reich, this did not in most cases spur a revaluation of the special con­
cerns of Austro-Germans.^4
In 1912 the combined membership of regional and interregional Ger­
man nationalist associations in Austria (including Bosnia-Hercegow- 
ina) stood at some 560,000.^^ xhe largest and best known of these orga­
nizations was the interregional German School Association, which
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counted some 200,000 members. Founded in 1880 the association saw 
its work very much in terms of updating, so to speak, a traditional Ger­
man colonial or settler presence in Eastern Europe. Its mission state­
ment deplored the recent losses by Germans to Slav and Italian peoples 
in an imagined demographic battle on the linguistic frontier. The Ger­
man School Association proposed to minimize further losses by fund­
ing German-language schools for linguistically mixed communities 
whose German-speaking population was too small to qualify them for 
a state-funded German-language school.^^
German School Association literature spoke in terms of losses and 
gains for a larger German nation, but one that was rarely defined by 
political boundaries. Instead, the association focused its efforts on the 
issue that supposedly united all German speakers in Austria: their role 
as guardians of a cultural frontier. The association defined this fron­
tier, however, in terms of its cultural and historic relationship to 
Vienna and not in terms of any relationship to the Wilhelmine Reich. 
Association writers occasionally analyzed Wilhelmine German atti­
tudes or policies toward so-called Polish incursions in East Prussia, for 
example, but always for comparative purposes and never to suggest 
that Austro-Germans somehow belonged to Germany. Furthermore, 
when writers traced the historic origins of German communities in 
Bohemia, Galicia, or the Bukovina, among others, they referred to 
German migrations in terms that emphasized their regional origins 
(Swabia, Bavaria, Saxony) and played the notion of the Wilhelmine 
Reich as a point of origin. Thus, despite the very different linguistic 
composition of their respective populations, Germany and Austria 
were treated in the pages of the German School Association magazines 
as sibling German states with complementary missions in Europe.
Another issue helped shape the sense of Austro-German identity 
negatively as it might relate to Wilhelmine Germany. Several Czech 
nationalist organizations consistently accused their German national­
ist opponents of constituting advance columns for Reich German pen­
etration. Reich Germans, it was insinuated, funded the German School 
Association. Such accusations implied that any popularity enjoyed by 
the association was illusory, the creation of powerful foreign interests. 
Czech nationalists hoped to diminish any sense of legitimacy or popu­
larity that might attach to the German School Association in Bohemia 
by implying that it was a foreign organization largely funded from 
across the border.^’
Over its almost forty-year existence the German School Association 
built or offered financial support to hundreds of kindergartens, pri-
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mary schools, and advanced schools for boys and girls throughout the 
empire. The association was careful, however, to avoid any rhetoric 
that might imply a mission to Germanize. It always defined its purpose 
in defensive terms, to remedy losses, strengthening the nation through 
German-language schooling so that no German children would be lost 
to another nation. The association was happy to accept students of 
Czech or Slovene parentage who wished their children to obtain an 
education in German, but it refuted accusations that it proselytized or 
pressured parents to enroll their children in its schools.^^ Czech and 
Slovene nationalists who supported the work of similar organizations 
of their own in turn accused the German School Association of out­
right Germanization. Both German and Czech nationalists constantly 
battled over children in linguistically mixed communities, complaining 
that employers and landlords exerted undue pressure on parents to 
enroll their children in the wrong school. This competition had the 
unintended if salubrious effect of dramatically increasing the numbers 
of schools, particularly in rural areas, and raising the general level of 
literacy and education among those populations where nationalist 
competition was at its fiercest.^^
Other nationalist organizations focused their efforts on securing the 
economic survival of German communities as well. How these organi­
zations defined both their purpose and the specific problems they 
hoped to address reveals a great deal about their imagined relationship 
to a larger German nation. In Habsburg East Central Europe the sup­
posed language frontiers (Sprachgrenze) mentioned previously, where 
speakers of two or more languages lived in close proximity to each 
other, were usually imagined to be located in rural regions. Within 
these areas the towns tended to have a German-speaking plurality, 
while speakers of other languages dominated the surrounding rural 
areas (thus the German linguistic term Sprachinsel, or “language 
island,” to describe such communities, which the editors of this volume 
have translated as “islands of Germanness”). In fact, mixed-language 
regions might be a more appropriate term for these areas, since their 
inhabitants generally could communicate in more than one language 
and families often included speakers of both languages. Such familial 
and social mixing was anathema to most nationalists, who saw it as a 
sign of demographic weakness. If an individual were bilingual, then 
what would prevent him and his children from crossing over to the 
other side?3°
Clearly an education in the appropriate language would help to pre­
vent this national tragedy. So would the economic measures men-
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tioned previously, those designed to keep rural communities viable and 
to prevent the enemy nation from practicing a kind of nationalist 
blackmail by means of boycotts or hostile housing policies. Both sides 
in such situations justified their own use of boycotts or selective hous­
ing in defensive terms, and both worked to prevent the other from 
gaining an economic upper hand. It is difficult to say with any certainty 
whether local populations paid much attention to nationalist exhorta­
tions to boycott. In addition to promoting economic stimulants (any­
thing from local tourism to the fruit trees and farm implements), these 
associations also engaged in charitable activities, handing out Christ­
mas presents to the poor, collecting clothing and food for the winter, or 
creating small local libraries. They constantly extended their realm of 
activism, attempting to nationalize all aspects of private and public life 
and thereby to realize the separation between cultures that they 
claimed already existed. These efforts became increasingly ambitious 
after 1900, so much so that in many cases the associations overstepped 
the very limits of their defensive origins in order to proclaim aggressive 
new projects.^'
The Union of Bohemian Germans extended the demographic 
metaphor to the issue of German orphans supposedly raised in Czeeh 
orphanages and thus lost to the German nation. The union built pri­
vate orphanages to save German children for the nation. Several other 
regional organizations followed the union’s example, although most 
relied more on the less expensive option of “orphan colonies,” villages 
where children were lodged with German foster parents. The Siidmark, 
operating primarily in Styria, Carinthia, and Krain, targeted a series of 
villages to the north of the Styrian city Marburg for German settle­
ment. A large majority of Marburgers spoke German, but the city itself 
was cut off demographically from the German-speaking territory to 
the north by a swathe of rural villages inhabited both by Slovene 
speakers and a minority of German speakers. The Sudmark hoped 
eventually to use its settlement program to Germanize the area directly 
to the north of Marburg and thus connect the “island” city to the Ger­
man “mainland.” The organization bought properties as they became 
available and sold them at reduced rates to farmers and artisans 
(largely Protestants from Wurttemberg in the German Reich, a fact 
that created unanticipated problems in overwhelmingly Catholic vil­
lages). Other regional organizations, such as the Nordmark (operating 
in Silesia), attempted to emulate this settlement program.3^
In both these cases nationalist associations adapted the rhetoric of a 
tradition of German colonialism and settlement to more modern ends.
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If, according to this rhetoric, Germans had been invited to colonize 
areas of Eastern Europe centuries ago because their economic habits 
and cultural superiority were recognized by local rulers, modern Ger­
mans too must pursue a similar cultural mission to prevent uncultured 
barbarians from ruining Austrian civilization. Here we must be careful 
to note the situational uses of colonial and settlement rhetoric on all 
sides. German historians may be surprised to learn that Slavic nation­
alist groups also engaged in discourses of colonialism and cultural 
superiority against the Germans when it suited their purposes. In par­
ticular, Czech nationalists portrayed Czech migrants to German areas 
as courageous colonizers, settling new regions within the lands of the 
Bohemian crown. Czech nationalists took every opportunity to tout 
their own cultural achievements and to contrast their own status as a 
modern Kulturnation to the often uncultured, loutish, and violent 
behavior of German nationalists.33 At other times, Czech nationalists 
liked to characterize the activities of their German nationalist rivals in 
terms of a brutal colonial relationship between Germanizing colonizer 
and Czech colonized. Some German nationalists too constructed their 
mission, as we have seen, in terms of bringing culture to a benighted 
East. At other times Germans might lament the fate of helpless Ger­
man minorities at the hands of invading Czech colonizers who over­
turned traditional existing social relations. The legacies of these tropes 
are particularly apparent among some Czechoslovakian Sudeten Ger­
mans in the 1930s and, interestingly, reemerge with particular vehe­
mence after their annexation to Germany in 1938. Sudeten German 
leaders and organizations frequently demanded special treatment for 
their followers due to their recent history of colonization, both real and 
imagined, at the hands of the merciless Czech nation-state.34
Every one of these claims reflected a strategic use of existing rhetor­
ical opportunities, although it should be clear that both those oppor­
tunities and the signiflcance of the rhetoric reflected changed realities 
after 1918. While those categorized as German nationals after 1918 may 
have suffered under their new rulers, we should not accept the often 
self-contradictory claims of either side on this issue as an accurate 
reflection of social, economic, and cultural relations in the Austrian 
Empire. Nor should we accept the ludicrous thesis that under the 
empire one side reproduced the kinds of relations that characterized 
European colonialism outside of Europe in its treatment of the other 
side. To do so would be to fall into the trap laid for us by nationalists 
themselves, to believe the myths about this earlier period propounded 
by German nationalists in post-1918 Germany or Slavic nationalists in
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the successor states. We do not have to look far for evidence that social 
relations among so-called nations were not as simple as the nationalists 
implied. The testimony of the latter provides plenty of evidence for the 
challenges faced by nationalists in a ffustratingly nonnationalist world. 
Both the Union of Germans in Bohemia and the Sudmark, for exam­
ple, experienced considerable difficulties in realizing their nationally 
more aggressive schemes, difficulties that suggest the fundamental 
chasm that separated nationalist claims about society from reality. 
When both the league and its Czech nationalist counterparts actually 
investigated their own orphan placement programs, they occasionally 
found that a supposedly reliable foster family was in fact raising the 
child in the wrong language or that the family’s knowledge of the 
national language was woefully inadequate. Families needing the extra 
funds simply claimed to be German or Czech, without perhaps grasp­
ing the freighted meaning of such an assertion. Similarly, the Sudmark 
experienced more than a little difficulty in determining whether a can­
didate for a farm was in fact an “authentic German” or simply a Ger­
man-speaking opportunist looking for a good deal.35
This set of problems reflects a larger contradiction faced by all 
nationalist organizations in the empire, one whose dimensions are 
illustrated by nationalist activism around the imperial census. Every 
ten years the empire carried out a census that included questions about 
language use. Nationalists liked to claim that language use as docu­
mented in the census indicated a form of national self-identification, 
and activists for each nation struggled to raise its census numbers rela­
tive to the others.German nationalists claimed, for example, that 
those who listed German as their language of daily use in the census 
questionnaires were in fact Germans. More often than not, however, 
nationalist organizations spent their sizeable resources trying to con­
vince German speakers themselves to become Germans. Their broad 
construction of German identity that included everyone who listed 
German on the census often papered over even deeper contradictions, 
since some nationalist organizations, for example, denied membership 
in the nation to Jews who claimed German as their language of daily 
use in the census. Nationalists might well refer to nations as if they 
were easily recognized and defined phenomena. Reality suggested that, 
to the extent that they existed at all, nations were remarkably ill- 
defined, unstable entities.
Although nationalist organizations claimed to strengthen the threat­
ened border or island populations of Germans in particular, most of 
them functioned in regions that were geographically not very far
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removed from majority German-speaking regions of Austria (and Ger­
many). There were some exceptions to this norm, one of which is par­
ticularly instructive regarding the question of diaspora and identity: 
the Association of Christian Germans in the Bukovina (Verein der 
christlichen Deutschen in der Bukovina). This organization tells us 
something about how German nationalists on the eastern periphery of 
the empire understood their Germanness and in particular how they 
imagined a relationship to the rest of a German nation. Unlike Ger­
man nationalists in the other contested regions, nationalists in the 
Bukovina, Galicia, or Bosnia-Herzegowina could trace their very exis­
tence to relatively recent migrations. In Galicia the power of the tradi­
tional Polish elite and its largely uncontested policy of Polonization, 
particularly in regard to education, meant that German nationalists 
there organized late and in relatively small numbers. German speakers 
had made up 5 percent of the Galician population in 1880, but by 1910 
that number had shrunk to just over i percent. Local German nation­
alist efforts succeeded more easily among Galicia’s German Protestant 
communities than among German-speaking Catholic ones, since Pol­
ish identity was intrinsically defined by a Catholic religious identity.37 
In the more interesting case of the Bukovina one could argue that no 
linguistic group was socially or historically dominant, although some 
were more dominant than others. The Bukovina was in fact Austria’s 
“most multicultural” province. Once the Bukovina had gained admin­
istrative independence from Galicia after 1848 (and again in the 1860s), 
the former Polish elite became a tiny and relatively powerless minority 
(3.5 percent) next to a majority of Ukrainian (Ruthene) speakers (38 
percent) and Romanian speakers (34 percent), followed by a significant 
German-speaking minority of over 20 percent. The German-speaking 
presence in the Bukovina dated from as recently as the 1780s, when 
under Joseph II German farmers had migrated east to regions recently 
annexed from Romanian boyars and divided by the Habsburgs with 
the Ottomans. Already in the early nineteenth century the cities and 
larger towns of the Bukovina had a particularly large German-speak­
ing presence. In Czernowitz, the capital, 47 percent of the inhabitants 
reported German as their language of daily use in 1900. Here also the 
government established a German-speaking university, thanks to the 
tireless efforts of a (Romanian-speaking) parliamentary deputy from 
Czernowitz, Constantine Tomaszcuk. Both the new university and the 
provincial administration served as something of a magnet for an edu­
cated German elite. Once the administration of the Bukovina had been 
separated from that of Galicia, the German language became one of
236 The Heimat Abroad
the two official provincial administrative languages, next to Romanian 
(Ukrainian was later added to the official list of official provincial lan­
guages as well). Business in the Diet was generally conducted in Ger­
man or Romanian.
These structural factors help to explain what may seem paradoxical: 
that in a place geographically so far removed from other German com­
munities in the empire, German speakers felt little need for connection 
either with each other or with a possible imagined German homeland 
back in the West. Most German-speaking communities in the Bukov- 
ina had little sense of belonging to a larger national community at all, 
despite their relatively recent arrival there. This is partly because rural 
Bukovina remained relatively cut off from the towns until well into the 
twentieth century. German-speaking farmers lived in unconnected 
rural communities dispersed throughout the Bukovina. The more 
urbanized and educated German speakers were primarily Jews, who 
constituted well over half of those statistically categorized as German 
speakers in the province. Non-Jewish German speakers, university 
professors, white-collar workers, and some merchants formed more of 
a German social community in cities like Czernowitz but do not seem 
to have viewed themselves as constituting a diaspora. This resulted 
from the fact that German speakers exercised proportionally as much 
(if not more) influence in provincial political and social affairs as did 
any other group. And unlike the situation in the rest of Austria, a sense 
of pragmatism rather than ideology or mutual suspicion characterized 
political relations between Jewish and Gentile German organizations 
in the Bukovina. In fact, relations among nationalist groups in the 
Bukovina were generally more manageable than elsewhere in the 
monarchy. Since no one group held a majority in the Diet, the German 
speakers often played a pivotal role allied either with the Romanian 
nationalists (most of the time) or with the Ruthenes.
For this reason, an interesting tension seems to mark accounts by 
German nationalist writers in the West of the Association of Christian 
Germans in the Bukovina. The former often presented the organiza­
tion to their readers as if its very raison d’etre lay in a bitter conflict 
that divided Germans and Jews in a barbarous eastern setting. In writ­
ing about the origins of this organization, for example, the anti-Semitic 
German nationalist Deutsche Volkszeitung in Reichenberg saw the 
association’s mission as the liberation of so-called Aryan Germans in 
the Bukovina from the financial thrall in which Jewish moneylenders 
held them. The organization itself, however, claimed that its appella­
tion of Christian was meant to differentiate it from Jewish Germans as
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much as its appellation of German functioned to differentiate it from 
Catholic Poles. It treated Jews as fellow German speakers who were, 
however, organized in a different set of social and cultural networks.3^ 
The efforts of the association, founded and led largely by professors 
at the university in Czernowitz, focused on raising the educational 
opportunities for German speakers in a region that suffered from some 
of the highest illiteracy rates in the empire. In particular, the associa­
tion hoped to encourage rural Germans to send their children to higher 
institutions of learning by providing housing and social support to 
youth from the country who attended the urban middle and high 
schools and the university in Czernowitz. The association also founded 
a chain of rural credit unions to battle peasant indebtedness to usurers, 
which was indeed high, but as far as I have been able to determine, its 
literature never associated Jews explicitly with this particular problem. 
In fact, the literature published by the association makes no mention at 
all of Jews, Jewish associations, or anti-Semitism.
The association made clear that it wished to inculcate German 
speakers with an understanding of their place in a larger German 
nation. Viewed from the perspective of Czernowitz, Kimpolung, or 
Radautz, however, that larger German nation often seems to have 
referred to a collectivity of German speakers within the Bukovina 
itself, as the easternmost outpost of the German nation within Austria. 
The association’s literature made no mention of Germany. Organizers 
did not conceive of themselves defensively as a threatened island of 
German culture in a sea of barbarous Slavs and Romanians the way 
German nationalists in the West often portrayed them. The associa­
tion promoted a sense of German pride of place in the Bukovina, 
depicting the society as a microcosm of Austria, a community admit­
tedly made up of several nations. This type of identification clearly 
grew out of the circumstances created by Imperial Austrian rule, a 
form of rule that did not define a privileged majority nation against 
minority populations in this region.39 
After World War I, when Romania gained control over the Bukov­
ina, the organized German community attempted to deal with the new 
government in the familiar terms to which it had become accustomed 
under the Austrian Empire. German leaders expected that their 
schools and cultural and political organizations would continue to 
flourish in a multicultural province of Romania, and they saw no con­
tradiction between their identities as Germans and their necessary loy­
alty to a Romanian state. Although the new regime officially accepted 
the written demands made upon it by elected representatives of the
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German community in 1918, government policy toward minority 
schools and cultural organizations became increasingly repressive dur­
ing the interwar period. It was largely as a result of this growing repres­
sion and of fears about the proximity of the Soviet Union that many in 
the Bukovina’s German community turned to Nazi Germany for sup­
port. A growing factionalism in the 1930s divided German community 
institutions, pitting those who demanded a “volkisch renewal” of the 
community and political orientation toward Nazi Germany against 
those who continued to seek accommodation with the Romanian state. 
With the invasion of the region by the Soviet Union in June 1940, the 
German community largely agreed to its resettlement in occupied 
Poland and later Germany.^®
After 1918
When German nationalists in East Central Europe sought rhetorical 
and organizational models to deal with their new and unprecedented 
situation after 1918, they generally turned to the strategies that seemed 
to have served them well under the Habsburg monarchy. This required 
a renewal of self-help organization, appeals to the international com­
munity for justice, and implicit attempts at accommodation with the 
new national governments. Since they saw themselves more as legiti­
mate players on the local political scene than as threatened outposts of 
an embattled Germany, they did not immediately redefine their 
activism in relation to Germany. Their adoption of prewar ways of 
thinking about the nation, derived from experience in a multicultural 
empire, made it difficult for these communities to redefine themselves 
successfully in terms of a necessary relationship to the Weimar or Nazi 
German state. So too did the apparent economic weakness and politi­
cal isolation of that German state in the early 1920s. This was as much 
the case with a group as politically influential as the so-called Sudeten 
Germans in Czechoslovakia as it was with smaller minority communi­
ties in Yugoslavia, Poland, and Romania, although the latter were 
often subjected to greater violence and more punitive state measures 
than were the Sudetens.
Economic depression brought a greater nationalist radicalism in the 
successor states in the 1930s. Traditional conservative regimes found 
themselves pressured to assert their nationalist credentials more 
aggressively or face challenges from restive populist movements. To 
many German observers, with their minority status perspective in the 
successor states, the accession of the Nazis to power in Germany
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seemed to reflect a powerful national renewal that might serve as a 
forceful ally in pursuing their minority rights. This suggested poten­
tially new avenues of redress that had not previously been available. 
Nowhere was this more clearly the case than in Czechoslovakia, where 
under pressure from a badly failing economy German speakers 
deserted their traditional parties for Henlein’s Nazis. And yet even 
here the old legacies of a different kind of nationalism continued to 
shape local concerns and demands made by German communities. 
Some Sudeten German activists in the 1930s who supported a full 
annexation of the Sudetenland claimed that the broader German­
speaking population in Czechoslovakia had so little understanding of 
the importance of its German identity that within a generation all sense 
of its German national identity would be lost. Once Germany had 
annexed the Sudetenland and asserted protectorate status for the rest 
of Bohemia-Moravia, Sudeten leaders continued to cast their particu­
lar demands on the state in terms that referred to debates from the 
Habsburg past. Thus in demanding that schoolteachers in particular 
not be called up to the Wehrmacht, German nationalists in the Sude­
tenland maintained that the Volk was not yet fully German and 
required an education in its own identity. Echoing the nineteenth-cen­
tury characterization of the schoolteacher as the instrument of the 
nation in the face of Czech attacks, activists claimed that, with German 
teachers serving in the ranks, the Volk would be left to the mercy of 
Czech-speaking teachers. As late as 1941, German nationalists in 
Bohemia still felt the nation had not adequately been forged!^'
Is it possible that we can only truly speak of German diasporas in 
Habsburg East Central Europe as an important element of memory 
after the brutal expulsions of 1945? In a sense the expulsions created the 
German diaspora communities within Germany that had not previ­
ously existed as such. I have argued that the vibrant communities of 
German speakers that dotted the landscapes of pre-1918 Habsburg 
Europe did not constitute German diasporas in the narrow sense 
because they did not define themselves in terms of a relationship to a 
German state. While they often may have seen themselves as German 
by 1914, we must be careful to locate exactly what that appellation 
actually meant to them. It seems yet another irony that Imperial Aus­
tria, a state that produced so much German nationalist activism, also 
produced a sense of German identity so unconcerned with its potential 
relationship to its German nation-state neighbor.
The Habsburg state enabled battling nationalists to live in extreme 
tension with one another even as it offered a powerful guarantee for
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the survival of each. This assertion has become something of a cliche, 
and it should not be confused with the notion that an idealized Habs- 
burg state functioned justly in every situation or that despite all 
appearances to the contrary the state had somehow “solved” its 
nationalities problems. Still, in order to promote its own survival the 
Austrian state had no choice but to dispense a kind of proportional 
justice to the increasingly important nationalists who peopled its terri­
tories. In doing so it unknowingly legitimized the existence of nations 
in the public sphere. Yet it did so in a context that promised to protect 
the rights of each. This promise in turn fueled nationalist activism, 
since some remote area of public life always remained that required 
further reform. This promise also framed the terms of nationalist polit­
ical activism in ways that would have been impossible in the context of 
a nation-state. An understanding of how people viewed the signifi­
cance of nation within this kind of framework remains elusive to us. It 
is close to impossible for inhabitants of our own nationalized world 
either to recapture or to understand what “nation” might have meant 
in a nonnationalized world.
While nationalist activism appeared to dominate politics in the 
Austrian Empire by 1914, this had not necessarily produced a mass 
society of nationalized individuals. Outside the political system, which 
was admittedly awash in nationalist activism, it is simply not clear to 
what extent people adopted or acted upon nationalist forms of self- 
identification. The concept of an Austro-German border identity pro­
moted by nationalist associations and popular authors, for example, 
did not necessarily reflect the actual experience of those who lived in 
linguistically mixed regions, unless political agitation had shaped the 
inhabitants’ views of their own situation. Even where nationalism 
clearly dominated social and cultural life, as it did in Bohemia, 
regional concerns often shaped particular forms of German self- 
identification, and this made these forms different to the point of 
unrecognizable to Germans from different regions. National identity 
only made sense if cast in a way that highlighted regional concerns 
and traditions. Whether or not German speakers in Austria explicitly 
proclaimed it, their Germanness was fundamentally defined by their 
Austrianness as well as by their particular region, not by their imag­
ined relationship to Wilhelmine Germany. After all, even the 
Bohemian German politicians who in 1918 opposed their annexation 
by the new Czechoslovakia demanded to remain a province of Ger­
man Austria (Deutsch Osterreich), and not Anschluss with Germany. 
To speak of the Germans in the Austrian Empire as constituting a
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self-conscious unified group, therefore, is a problematic venture, to 
say the least. To speak of German diasporas before 1918 is even more 
problematic.
The term German diaspora as it is applied to communities in Habs- 
burg East Central Europe (and perhaps others) must refer somewhat 
to the self-understanding of these communities. And these communi­
ties existed in a world where German identity, to the extent that it held 
meaning for people, did not refer to the German nation-state. If, there­
fore, interwar German nationalist politics in East Central Europe were 
constructed in Brubaker’s triangular terms (diaspora-host nation— 
Germany), it is the rise of this new way of conceiving nationalist poli­
tics that requires further explanation. New attitudes and approaches to 
nationalist activism and identity management had to be forged. They 
were not simply given by the political situation. If Germans in formerly 
Habsburg Central Europe came to see their identities defined in terms 
of a relationship to the German state, then that development must be 
explained; it cannot simply be presumed. As German historians reex­
amine Germany’s relationship to its Eastern neighbors, they will need 
to do this from a perspective of the East itself and not simply from the 
perspective of the West.
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